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Abstract
A new proposal for group key exchange is introduced which proves to
be both efficient and secure and compares favorably with state of the art
protocols.
1 Introduction
Group Key Exchange (GKE) is currently a highly relevant topic due to the ex-
plosion of group communications in many applications that provide information
exchange (cf. [7] and [14] and their references). A very recent application can
be found in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), core of the so-called Internet of
Things, that consists of tiny autonomous low-cost low-power devices that carry
out monitoring tasks. WSNs can be found in many civil applications. The de-
vices are called sensor nodes and the monitored data is typically collected at a
base station, that will be later processed in data mining servers.
Since Ingemarsson et al. in [6] made an attempt to extend Diffie-Hellman
two-party key exchange given in [5], many works have dealt with this issue, i.e.,
providing protocols for a group of communication nodes that allow this group
to build a common key in a distributed and collaborative manner. In [11] the
authors gave a distributed protocol for GKE that does not run efficiently in
the Initial Key Agreement (IKA), which is, in most cases, the main problem.
Probably two of the best known distributed protocols are given in [12] and
[13], and [3] and [4], respectively, and both extend naturally the foundational
Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
The protocol introduced in [3] and [4] proves to be very efficient in the IKA,
using just two rounds. However, further rekeying operations require executing
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the protocol completely as in the initial phase (IKA) and produce a big number
of messages, using a large bandwidth as the number of communication nodes
grows.
On the other hand, the protocol introduced in [12] and [13] is quite efficient
in the rekeying processes, i.e., rekeying operations once the group has shared
a first key. The authors give an Auxiliary Key Exchange (AKA) that makes
use of a single broadcasted message, although the IKA protocol is considerably
slower than the preceding one since it requires as many rounds as the number
of participants.
But the main issue in both efficient proposals is their security. In [10] and [1]
active attacks to the systems proposed in [12] and [13], and [3] and [4] respec-
tively are introduced. The authors show the possibility of sharing a common
key with the components of a communication group, without letting them no-
tice anything. However, one of the IKA proposals introduced in [12] and [13]
(the so-called IKA.1) avoids this attack, but, as pointed out above, it requires
a big numbers of rounds as the number of users grows.
In this paper we are introducing a new proposal that avoids both attacks ([1]
and [10]) and shows the best characteristics of the aforementioned proposals: on
one hand, the key is obtained in a distributed IKA with just two rounds and, on
the other, the AKA protocol that provides rekeying operations is developed by
means of a single message. Our protocol extends naturally the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange as well and we show that its security is based on the difficulty of
problems that refer to decisions in the group where the two party Diffie-Hellman
key exchange takes place. Namely, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) prob-
lem in a group G is the problem to decide whether, given g in G and random
x, y, z in G, z equals xlogg y.
2 The Initial Key Agreement
Let us start by establishing the general setting for the GKE protocol. Partici-
pants in the communication process will be given by the set {U1, . . . Un}. The
group of users agree on a cyclic group G of order a prime q and a generator g
of G.
Every participant Ui holds two pairs of private-public keys, say (ri, gri) and
(xi, g
xi). One of these users will be the group controller that we will denote
by Uc1 , for some c1 in the set {1, . . . , n}. He will be in charge of sending the
initial keying information as well as the following rekeying messages in case we
wish to define a centralized protocol. However, as we will see in the following
section, the character of the protocol can change from centralized to distributed
(and vice versa) at any point of the following rekeying stages. The protocol that
describes the initial key agreement is given by the following steps.
Protocol 1:
First Round:
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1. Every user Ui publishes his pair of public keys (gri , gxi), i = 1, . . . , n,
i 6= c1.
2. The group controller Uc1 computes the key K1 = grc1
∑n
j=1,j 6=c1 rj .
3. The group controller takes a new pair of private elements (r′c1 , x
′
c1), which
becomes his new private information. This will be used in the case of a
rekeying operation at a later stage.
Second Round:
4. Every user, using the public information, Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1, computes
g
∑n
j=1,j 6=c1,i rj and sends this value to Uc1 .
5. The group controller Uc1 broadcasts the keying message
{Y1,1, . . . , Y1,c1 , . . . , Y1,n, R1, S1}
where Y1,i = g
−xc1xi
(
grc1
∑
j 6=c1,i rj
)
, for i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1,
Y1,c1 = K1g
−r′c1rc1 g−x
′
c1
xc1 , and R1 = g
rc1 and S1 = g
xc1 .
6. Every user Ui computes K1,i = Y1,iSxi1 Rri1 , i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1.
The proof of the following Lemma is straightforward and shows the correct-
ness of the protocol.
Lemma 2.1. K1,i = K1 for every i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1.
Remark 2.2. Let us assume that the number of users is n = 2 and that gxi = e
for i = 1, 2, where e ∈ G is the neutral element. Now if U1 makes public gr1
in the first round, U2 will send the keying message {e,R1 = gr2} in the second
round. Thus our protocol is a natural extension of the classical Diffie-Hellman
key exchange in the group G.
It can be observed in the preceding protocol that user Uc1 bears most of the
workload. The protocol is designed in such a way that every node publishes
just a pair of public keys, while Uc1 computes what is required for the first
keying. This could be the case when Uc1 is a server that processes the pieces of
information transmitted by every user. However, in case every user has similar
capabilities, we can slightly modify the preceding protocol and distribute the
computation requirements. As previously, every user holds a pair of private keys
(ri, xi).
Protocol 2:
First Round:
1. Every user Ui publishes his public key gri , i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1.
2. The group controller Uc1 computes the key K1 = grc1
∑n
j=1,j 6=c1 rj .
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3. The group controller takes a new pair of private elements (r′c1 , x
′
c1), which
becomes his new private information.
Second Round:
4. Every user, using the public information, Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1, computes
g
∑n
j=1,j 6=c1,i rjg−xi and sends this value to Uc1 .
5. The group controller Uc1 broadcasts the keying message
{Y1,1, . . . , Y1,c1 , . . . , Y1,n, R1}
where Y1,i =
(
grc1
∑
j=1,j 6=c1,i rj
)
g−rc1xi , for i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1,
Y1,c1 = K1g
−r′c1rc1 g−x
′
c1
rc1 , and R1 = g
rc1 .
6. Every user Ui computes K1,i = Y1,iRxi1 Rri1 , i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c1.
We will now state the security of the preceding protocols. To this end let us
now recall the following definition.
Definition 2.3. [4, Definition 2.2] Let P be a GKE protocol and A a passive
adversary. Assume that A has witnessed polynomially-many instances of P and
let K be the key output by the last instance.
We will say that P guarantees secrecy if A cannot distinguish K from a
random bit string of the same length with probability better than 1/2 + ε,
where ε is negligible
Theorem 2.4. If the DDH problem is intractable, then Protocols 1 and 2 pro-
vide secrecy.
Proof. We observe that we can see the broadcasted message in Protocol 1 as a
multiple ElGamal type of encryption in the following way. For i 6= c1 we first
encrypt K1 using the public value g
ri and rc1 as random parameter, obtaining(
X1,i, R1
)
=
(
grc1
∑
j 6=c1,i rj , grc1
)
and then we encrypt Xi using the public key
gxi and xc1 as a random parameter, obtaining the pair
(
Y1,i, S1
)
.
The case of Y1,c1 is analogous using the elements g
r′c1 and gx
′
c1 , that, although
unknown to a passive adversary, could also be made public.
Now using Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 of [2] we can deduce the thesis.
The security of Protocol 2 follows similarly.
Remark 2.5. For ease of notation we have presented the preceding protocols
using the action Φ(y, gx) = (gx)y, but more general scenarios based on linear
actions can be considered too, as in [8].
Remark 2.6. We could wonder about the necessity of using two different keys
for every user. To clarify this suppose only one key is used. Then we would
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share a key of the form K = gkj
∑n
r=1,r 6=j kr . Without the xi, an adversary could
access the messages
Di = g
kj
∑n
r=1,r 6=i,j kr , i 6= j, i = 1, . . . , n,
from which she can compute
∏n
r=1,r 6=j Dr = K
n−2. In the case where the
order q of S is known, the adversary can now recover the key K from Kn−2 by
inverting n− 2 modulo q. This is in particular the case where G is a subgroup
of a finite field, or where it is the group of points of an elliptic curve. Using two
different keys for every user avoids the above situation in these cases. However,
the use of a single key for every user could still apply in other settings [8].
3 The Auxiliary Key Agreement
In the preceding section we have introduced a protocol to build a common key
based on the information held by every user. As we can observe this may require
some computational resources on one of the participants. On the other hand,
this session key may expire due simply to key caducity or to changes in the
communication group, i.e., users may join or leave the group and we are con-
cerned about preserving secrecy of previous, respectively, later communications.
In this section we provide an Auxiliary Key Agreement that solves this matter
very efficiently and, moreover, allows either to keep the centralized aspect of the
GKE, or to change to a distributed scheme, allowing any user to provide a new
key for the remaining members of the group.
In the more general setting, we are assuming that some rekeying rounds
have occurred, and in the next step keys are to be renewed again possibly by
a new controller. The following protocol shows the Auxiliary Key Agreement
after t − 1 rekeying rounds, t > 1, whereby Kt denotes the last common key
shared by the group. The user in charge of the t-th rekeying will be user Uct ,
distinct from the preceding controller, and thus, rekeying information of this
will be needed. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the precedent
controller was user Uc1 , the key shared was Kt−1 and the last rekeying message
was
{Yt−1,1, . . . , Yt−1,c1 , . . . , Yt−1,n, Rt−1, St−1}
where Yt−1,c1 = Kt−1g
−r′c1rc1 g−x
′
c1
xc1 , following Protocol 1. The proposed AKA
is then as follows: Protocol 3:
1. User Uct computes two new elements r′ct and x′ct ∈ G that become his new
private information.
2. User Uct computes the new session key K
r′ct
t−1.
3. User Uct broadcasts the rekeying message
{Yt,1, . . . , Yt,ct , . . . , Yt,n, Rt, St}
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where Yt,i = Y
r′ct
t−1,i, i 6= ct,
Yt,ct = KtR
−r′ctr
′
ct
t−1 S
−r′ctx
′
ct
t−1 ,
and Rt = R
r′ct
t−1 and St = S
r′ct
t−1.
4. Every user Ui computes Kt,i = Yt,iSxit Rrit , i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= ct.
Lemma 3.1. Kt,i = Kt for every i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. For i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= ct
Kt,i = Yt,iS
xi
t R
ri
t
= Y
r′ct
t−1,iS
xir
′
ct
t−1 R
rir
′
ct
t−1
= (Yt−1,iSxit−1R
ri
t−1)
r′ct
= K
r′ct
t−1
= Kt.
3.1 Altering the membership
As it was previously pointed out members of the group can be constantly chang-
ing: some of them may leave the group and other may wish to join it. For this
reason it is convenient that those joining the group should not be able to get
previously distributed keys and those leaving it should not get future distributed
keys in order to preserve confidentiality of former and future communications.
In the case of a set of members leaving the group, rekeying is made natu-
rally following Protocol 2, but erasing those positions in the rekeying message
corresponding to those users leaving the group.
On the other hand joining operation can be carried out in a massive way
and by any of the users. Let us assume that after the t-th rekeying message,
l users wish to join the group. Then the corresponding values Rt and St are
made public and without loss of generality, we may suppose that these l users
sent a petition to join the group to a user that will be Uct+1 for some ct+1 in
the set {1, . . . , n}.
In case the petitions are sent to different users, each of them may collect the
received petitions and send a rekeying message including the petitioners after a
period of time. The protocol is as follows:
Protocol 4.
1. Every new user Un+j , j = 1, . . . , l, sends a petition to user Uct+1 jointly
with the pair R
rn+j
t , S
xn+j
t , where rn+j , xn+j ∈ G is the user Un+j ’s private
information.
2. User Uct+1 computes two new elements r′ct+1 , x′ct+1 ∈ G that become his
new private information.
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3. User Uct+1 computes the new key Kt+1 =
(
KtR
∑l
i=1 rn+i
t
)r′ct+1 .
4. User Uct+1 broadcasts the rekeying message
{Yt+1,1, . . . , Yt+1,ct+1 , . . . , Yt+1,n, Yt+1,n+1, . . . , Yt+1,n+l, Rt+1, St+1}
where Yt+1,i =
(
Yt,iR
∑l
i=1 rn+i
t
)r′ct+1 , for i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= ct+1,
Yt+1,ct+1 = Kt+1R
−r′ct+1r
′
ct+1
t S
−r′ct+1x
′
ct+1
t ,
Yt+1,i = Kt+1R
−rir′ct+1
t S
−xir′ct+1
t , for i = n + 1, . . . , n + l,
Rt+1 = R
r′ct+1
t and St+1 = S
r′ct+1
t .
5. Every user Ui computes Kt+1,i = Yt+1,iSxit+1Rrit+1, i = 1, . . . , n+l, i 6= ct+1.
Analogously to Lemma 3.1 we get the following.
Lemma 3.2. After Protocol 3, Kt+1,i = Kt+1 for every i = 1, . . . , n + l, i 6=
ct+1.
Also, using the same argument as in the IKA protocol, we may show that
protocols for rekeying and altering the membership provide secrecy for the for-
mer and future keys distributed.
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